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1962] RECENT DECISIONS 655 
SECURITIES REGULATION-FEDERAL COURTS-PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION 
UNDER THE INVESTMENT COMPANY Ac::r OF 1940-Two actions for damages 
were brought against officers and directors of a mutual investment fund 
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alleging violations of the Investment Company Act of 1940.1 These actions, 
by the fund itself and by a stockholder on behalf of the fund, were con-
solidated in a federal district court. The court denied defendant's motion 
to dismiss for want of federal jurisdiction. On an interlocutory appeal by 
the non-affiliated directors, held, reversed. The Investment Company Act 
of 1940 does not expressly or by implication create a private right of action 
cognizable in the federal courts against non-affiliated directors. Brouk v. 
Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated and remanded 
for dismissal as moot, 82 Sup. Ct. 878 (1952) .2 
Since the basis for the decision in the principal case is not made clear, 
it may rest on either or both of two grounds: (I) there is no private right 
of action cognizable in the federal courts for damages resulting from vio-
lations of duties and liabilities created by the act; or (2) there may be 
such a right of action, but there is none against these particular appellants. 
The act purports to protect stockholders and investors,3 such as the plain-
tiff, against abuses, but affords them no express means of enforcement. 
The only express enforcement provisions of the act are found in sections 
364 and 42,5 which give limited enforcement powers to the Securities and 
Exchange 'Commission. However, section 44 grants jurisdiction to federal 
district courts " ... of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to 
enforce any liability or duty created by ... this title ... ,"6 and from 
1 The violations alleged in the complaint were that the directors: (a) operated the 
fund in their own interest, rather than in the interest of the fund's security holders. 
§ 1 (b) (2), 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (b) (2) (1958); (b) caused the fund 
to publish and circulate documents containing untrue statements or omitting material 
facts, § 34, 54 Stat. 840 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a•33 (1958); (c) caused the fund to 
deviate from a fundamental investment policy. § 13, 54 Stat. 811 (1940), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-13 (1958); and (d) that certain of the directors acted as investment advisers without 
a written contract approved by the outstanding voting securities of the fund. § 15 (a) , 
54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (a) (1958). For a general discussion of the act, 
see Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303 (1941); Motley, 
Jackson &: Barnard, Federal Regulation of Investment Companies Since 1940, 63 HARV. 
L. REV. 1134 (1950); Thomas, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 9 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 918 (1941); Tolins, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 77 
(1940); Comment, 50 YALE L.J. 440 (1941). 
2 See Eisenberg and Phillips, Mutual Fund Litigation-New Frontiers for the Invest-
ment Company Act, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 73 (1962) ; 75 HARV. L. REv. 634 (1962) ; 13 STAN. 
L. REv. 964 (1961) . 
3 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 1 (b), 54 Stat. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (b) (1958): 
"It is ••• declared that the policy and purposes of this title •.• are to mitigate and, 
so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions enumerated in this section which adversely 
affect the national public interest and the interest of investors." 
4 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 36, 54 Stat. 841, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1958), 
whereby the Securities and Exchange Commission is exclusively empowered to enjoin 
gross misconduct and abuse of trust. 
5 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 42, 54 Stat. 842, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958), 
which provides for injunctive enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
6 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 44, 54 Stat. 844, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1958). 
Furthermore, the reporting requirements of section 33 would appear to be consistent 
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this section the existence of a private right of action may be implied. In 
Brown v. Bullock, 1 involving the same substantive issues as the principal 
case, the court found an implied private right of action in favor of the 
mutual fund's stockholders. Although violations other than those involved 
in the principal case were alleged, the court, in considering the legislative 
history and the scope and purpose of the act, found that the duties and 
liabilities set forth could be enforced by means of private damage actions. 
Such a right of action has been implied in several other recent cases under 
the Investment Company Act8 by analogy to earlier cases in other areas 
of securities regulation under similar statutory provisions.9 
If the decision in the principal case was based on the first ground, that 
with the implication of a private right of action, particularly in the principal case. 54 
Stat. 839 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-32 (1958), provides that: (a) "Every registered invest-
ment company which is a party and every affiliated person of such company who is a 
party defendant to any action or claim by a registered investment company or a security 
holder thereof in a derivative capacity against an officer, director, ••• for an alleged 
breach of official duty ••• , shall transmit .•• [certain documents showing the results 
of such action] ..• to the .•• [Securities and Exchange] Commission." 
7 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961) (en bane) . 
8 Schwartz v. Bowman, 156 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), appeal dismissed sub nom. 
Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959); Brown v. Eastern States Corp., 181 F.2d 
26 (4th Cir. 1950); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960) 
(dictum), 74 HAR.v. L. REv. 1660 (1961); Cogan v. Johnston, 162 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 
1958); Breswick &: Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd on other 
grounds, 353 U.S. 151 (1957). See generally 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1043-60 (2d 
ed. 1961) ; 3 id. 2005. 
ll See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) [Securities Act of 
1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1958) ]. A civil cause of action was implied under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958), in the following 
cases: Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Fratt v. 
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 
799 (3d Cir. 1949); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 
(1944); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Remar v. Clayton Sec. 
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 
512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), 61 HARV. L. REv. 858 (1948), 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 471 (1947) . The 
same result was obtained under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 
Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1958), in Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). 
The rationale underlying such an implication of a private right of action is the 
judicially-developed statutory tort doctrine: members of a class for whose protection a 
statutory duty is created may sue for injuries resulting from its breach; and the common 
law will supply a remedy if the statute gives none. Texas &: Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 
U.S. 33 (1916). To the same effect, see Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., supra note 8, 
at 217; Baird v. Franklin, supra at 245; cf. Breswick &: Co. v. United States, supra note 8, 
at 138. 
In the Second Circuit's opinion in Brown v. Bullock, the principal case is cited as 
perhaps distinguishable if it holds only that there is no remedy afforded by the act 
against non-affiliated directors of registered investment companies in these circumstances; 
however, the court expresses its doubts as to whether this was, or should have been, the 
ground of decision, and disagrees with the decision so far as it is not distinguishable. 
294 F.2d 415, 422. But see Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
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no private right of action can be implied, it would appear that the con-
trary decision in Brown reaches a more favorable result. This is particu-
larly so in light of the declared congressional intent as to the policy and 
purposes of the act: " ... to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate 
the conditions enumerated in this section which adversely affect the na-
tional public interest and the interest of investors."10 Although no express 
provision imposing civil liability appears in the act, and although there 
has been no authoritative settlement of the issue by the Supreme Court,U 
it would seem to be conducive to the effective enforcement of the act that 
private rights of action be implied.12 
Assuming, however, that the court in the principal case did not base its 
holding on the first ground, then the alternative ground, that there was no 
right of action against these particular appellants, appears to be contrary 
to the terms of the statute. The only parties to appeal from the denial of 
the dismissal motion were the directors who were not affiliated with the 
managing company or the investment adviser of the fund. Non-affiliated 
directors have the same responsibility as ordinary corporate directors; their 
non-affiliated status is merely a creation of the act,13 and does not neces-
sarily lessen their obligations.14 Furthermore, the statutory definition of 
"director" makes no such distinction as the decision in the principal case 
might imply.15 Therefore, there seems to be no basis for the conclusion 
10 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 1 (b), 54 Stat. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l (b) 
(1958). 
11 The Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity in the principal case, but 
when the parties settled, the case was vacated as moot. 82 Sup. Ct. 878 (1962) . 
12 The authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission to seek injunctive relief 
does not necessarily preclude private actions. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 245 
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179, 219 (D. Del. 1960) • 
In Brown v. Bullock the Commission appeared as amicus curiae, urging federal jurisdic-
tion in private damage actions. 294 F.2d 415, 417 (2d Cir. 1961). 
It would appear that any injunctive or other relief that is available through the Com-
mission has not satisfied the complaining parties. Prior to the commencement of the 
actions in the principal case a stop order was issued by the Commission against Managed 
Funds, Inc. In re Managed Funds, Inc., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4122, July 30, 
1959. Despite the stop order, plaintiff still demanded damages for the alleged violations. 
Furthermore, numerous actions 11re now pending in the Southern District of New York 
and other federal district courts, in which private damage remedies are being asserted. 
See Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 417 (2d Cir. 1961). 
13 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 10, 54 Stat. 806, 15 U.S.C. § S0a-10 (1958). 
This provision opens with the statement that "no registered investment company shall 
have a board of directors more than 60 per centum of the members of which are per-
sons who are investment advisers of, affiliated persons of .•• , or officers or employees 
of, such registered company." This broad declaration is subject to various exceptions 
according to particular circumstances. 
14 Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 395 (Del. Ch. 1961). See Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 
151 F.2d 254, 260-61 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946); Greene, Fiduciary 
Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 266 (1959) . 
Hi Investment Company Act of 1940, § 2 (12), 54 Stat. 790, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (12) 
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that, for the same violations, the act affords a remedy against affiliated 
directors and yet does not afford a similar remedy against non-affiliated 
directors. 
Irrespective of whether the court's interpretation of the substantive 
provisions of the act are correct, its disposition of the principal case on 
a motion attacking jurisdiction can justifiably be criticized. It would ap-
pear that the court used an improper test in determining the jurisdictional 
issue. Section 44 states that the district court has jurisdiction to hear 
actions at law under the act. The jurisdictional question presented in the 
principal case was whether the plaintiff's claim properly invoked the juris-
diction of the district court. The Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood16 said 
that a federal court, in determining its jurisdiction, ". . . must look to 
the way the complaint is drawn to see if it is drawn so as to claim a 
right to recover under the Constitution and laws of the United States."17 
However, there is no jurisdiction where " ... the alleged claim ... clearly 
appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining 
jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous."18 
It does not readily appear that the claim in the principal case is so 
insubstantial or frivolous as to warrant dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, 
particularly in light of the ambiguous nature of the jurisdictional grant in 
section 44 of the act,19 the length of the opinion which the court thought 
necessary to justify its decision, and the many other cases in which a pri-
vate right of action has been implied under the act.20 "[I]f the plaintiff 
really makes a substantial claim under an act of Congress there is jurisdic-
tion whether the claim ultimately be held good or bad."21 Hence, a 
(1958) : "'Director' means any director of a corporation or any person performing similar 
functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated. • . ." 
16 327 U.S. 678 (1946), an action for damages against FBI agents charged with 
having detained plaintiffs and having searched their premises in violation of the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments. The Supreme Court held that a federal district court had 
jurisdiction of the action. 
17 327 U.S. at 681. 
18 Id. at 682. See Comment, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 1090, 1095 (1948); cf. United States 
v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1951); American Rolex Watch Corp. v. Jack Laufer & 
Jan Voort, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 858, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). 
Justice Stone felt that the limits that the majority had set for obtaining jurisdiction 
were too broad; that where neither the Constitution ". • . nor any act of Congress 
affords a remedy •.• , the mere assertion by a plaintiff that he is entitled to such a 
remedy cannot be said to satisfy jurisdictional requirements." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 
678, 685 (dissenting opinion) . 
111 Section 44 gives to district courts jurisdiction of "all actions at law," yet the act 
contains no express provision creating an action at law. Investment Company Act of 1940, 
§ 44, 54 Stat. 844, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1958). 
20 See cases cited note 7-8 supra. 
21 The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). In Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 
415 (2d Cir. 1961) , jurisdiction under the act was sustained and the court also deter-
mined the merits of the claimed private right of action on the basis of a motion to 
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determination of the merits of the plaintiffs' right of action and of the 
liability of the non-affiliated directors should not have been attempted 
under the guise of a jurisdictional appeal. 
The court in the principal case has examined the Investment Company 
Act in such detailed manner, in determining whether a private right of 
action was afforded and what liabilities should be imposed, that it is ap-
parent that the court rejected the jurisdictional test set forth in Bell v. 
Hood, and actually considered meritorious issues.22 If the Supreme Court 
adheres to the Bell v. Hood test, the court of appeals will appear to have 
erred in denying jurisdiction. Therefore, regardless of which ground was 
the actual basis for the decision, it would seem that the principal case 
should be reversed. Private rights of action should be afforded by impli-
cation under the Investment Company Act of 1940, and, once it has been 
decided that plaintiffs seeking damages have the right to sue, the question 
of the civil liability of non-affiliated directors should be for the court to 
determine on the merits, and not in deciding the threshold question of 
jurisdiction. 
Lee D. Powar 
dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. Cxv. P. 
12 (b) (6) • No such motion was made in the principal case. 
22 Judge Clark, in a concurring opinion in Brown v. Bullock, supra note 21, at 422, 
stated that jurisdiction had been found by the district court on the allegations of the 
complaint and that the majority was prematurely considering meritorious issues. The 
result of a court attempting to decide a jurisdictional matter and finding itself en-
trenched in meritorious issues could have serious consequences in two areas: (1) Col-
lateral estoppel-the plaintiffs may be foreclosed from reconsidering issues litigated in 
the federal court, were they to institute a similar action in a state court. REsTATEMENT, 
JUDGMENTS § 45, comments c and d (1942) . The appeal to the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in Brown v. Bullock was allowed only on condition that the plaintiffs 
stay similar proceedings in a state court. 194 F. Supp. 207, 248-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
However, such procedures may not always be available. (2) The doctrine of pendent 
jurisdiction would lose much of its efficacy, as the non-federal claim will fail if meritorious 
issues are resolved in denying jurisdiction. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); see 
also Comment, 52 YALE L.J. 922 (1943); Note, 34 MINN. L. RE.v. 559 (1950); Note, 36 VA. 
L. RE.v. 545 (1950) • However, the intermingling of jurisdictional and meritorious ques-
tions on appeal can be obviated under the Federal Rules by making motions to dismiss 
both for lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, FED. R. Cxv. P. 12 (b) (1); and for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (b) (6). 
